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IN THE SUPREME COURT
, OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

BEEHIVE STATE BANK,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE ROSQUIST, and ILA R. PAINTER, Individuals,
and CARPETS INC., a corporation,
Defendants,

Case No.
11951

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a corporation,
Garnishee,
FRED L. PA INTER,
Intervener-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPO·NDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is the second appeal of this case to this Court
an<l concerns the right of a judgment creditor of a joint
depositor to the funds held in a joint bank account pursuant to a writ of garnishment.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon remand after the first appeal in this case,
the lower court took evidence concerning the contract
governing the joint account in question and held that
1

Ila R. Painter, wife of intervener-appellant, had an interest in and a right to the entire amount in the joint
account. Consequently, a garnishee judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff-respondent for the entire amount
being held in the joint account pursuant to the writ of
garnishment, or $723.79. Intervener-appellant's complaint in intervention was dismissed with prejudice.

RELIEF SOUGH'!' ON APPEAL
Intervener-appellant would have this Court reverse
the lower court, enter a judgment in favor of intervenerappellant for the entire amount in the subject joint account, and award
interest from the
date of garnishment, costs and attorney's fees. Plaintiff.
respondent prays that the Court affirm the lower court
in all respects.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not take any great issue with the
facts as set forth by appellant in his brief. Nevertheless,
there are several facts either omitted or distorted by
appellant which respondent feels compelled to rectify.
First, in the prior appeal of this case before this
Court, the trial court's summary judgment for appellant
was reversed and the case was remauded for the taking
of evidence. In that appeal, this Court held that a contract ostensibly creating a joiut tenancy with full right;;
of survivorship is presumed to lie a bona fide joint tenancy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
that the contract was not enforceable liecause of fraud,
2

mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or that the contract should be reformed under equitable rules to show
some other agreement of the parties. In reYersing the
trial court, this Court held that the interest of Ila R.
Painter in and to the fund ·while she was alive should be
applied toward the satisfaction of respondent's judgment against her.
Second, during the trial of this case upon remand
before Judge Hall, the joint account contract governing the subject account and signed by appellant and his
wife was admitted into evidence. That contract stated:
The joint depositors ... hereby agree with
each other and with the above bank that all sums
now on deposit heretofore or hereafter deposited
by any one or more of said joint depositors ...
are and shall be owued by them jointly with right
of surviYorship, and be subject to the check ... of
any one or more of them ...
(Exhibit 1-P)
Third, there was no attempt by appellant at trial to
show under equitable rules that the above contract should
be reformed to some other agreement of the parties to
the account, nor was evidence presented to indicate that
the contract was not enforceable because of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity. (See Record at 17885.) Therefore, the lower court found that the joint account contrad was valid and enforceable at the time of
service of the garnishment and that it was the only
agreement of the parties relating to the account. (Record
at 134-35.) Because Ila R. Painter under the terms of
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the written eontract had a right to all of the funds j 11
the account, the lower eonrt awarded respondent judgment for the entire amount in account. (Id.)

POIN'r l
APPT1:LL.:\NT IS (' 0 N ('LU R TVJj: LY
BY THE
AGRJGEI\lENT
ACCOUNT.
GOV"BmNING
The law in Utah presently gowrni11g joint hauk accounts was set forth by this Court in the first appeal of
this case when it stated:

It seems to us that \\'hat all of the recent
cases in Utah
heen tryiHg to say is this:
If the contract between the parties ostensibly creates a joi11t tenancy relationship with
full right of snnivorship, there arises a presumption that such is the case unless and
until some intcn•sted party shows under
equitable rules that the contract should be
reformeJ to show somr other agreement of
the parties or that the contrad is not enforceable because of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity.

\Ve hold that the law is as abo,·e i11Jicated.

Beehive State Bauk 1_:. Rosq11ist, 21 Utah 2d 17, 21-22,
P.2d 468, 471 (1968). Further darificatiou of tlw a bore
pronouncemcut was made in Coutinc11tal Bank and Trnsf
Company 1'. Kimball, 21 Utah 2d 152, 442 P.2d 472 (1968).
The sole issue in that casr was whether the appellant
could introduce evidencr to alter the apparent contrac4

tnal relationship governing several joint accounts. It
was held that the appellant was conclusively bound by
tlrn contract. This Court stated:
Since the appellant is not trying to reform the
contract and is not claiming fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, we think that it is
conclusively bound by the contract as made and
cannot show that the parties intended a result
contrary to that which the law of joint tenancy
relationship imposes.
ld. at 154, 442 P.2d at 474. (Emphasis added.)

A written instrument may be reformed if, by accident, inadvertence, mistake, fraud or inequitable conLlnd, the instrument fails to express the intention of the
parties. In the absence of satisfactory proof of accident,
fraud, or mistake, there is no basis for a court of equity
to reform an instrument. 45 Am. Jur. Reformation of
Instruments
(1943). Appellant makes no attempt
under such equitable rules to reform the written contract; nor does he claim fraud, mistake, incapacity or
other infirmity to render the contract unenforceable.
The only evidence offered by appellant during trial
in this case concerned the fact that the funds in the account came from appellant exclusively, that appellant's
wife could write checks on the account but did not, that
the account was for the payment of household expenses,
and that appellant's wife had a cash allowance for her
own use. (Record at 178-85; see Brief of Appellant at
!l, 17.) Appellant tries to show from this evidence that
there was necessarily au intention to giYe his wife only
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a sunivorship interest i11 the account. (Brief of Ap.
pellant at 11.) ·without attempting to reform the writteu
contract by equitable rules all(l without a showing of
unenforceability, appellant is foreclos<:>cl from showing
that he and/or his wife intended a result contrary to
the explicit terms of the written agreement which conferred a present and undi,·ided interest in appellant's
wife. See Andrus l'. Blazzard, 2:3 Utah 233, 254, 63 P. 888,
892-93 ( 1901).

POINT II
THJ1'J TRIAL COURT
FOUND THE INTEREST OF THE JUDGDEBTOR TO WHICH RESPONDENT
IS ENTITLED.
In connection with the prior appeal of this case, this
Court stated that "the interest of Ila R. Painter in and
to the fund while she was aliYC, if any she had, should
he applied toward the satisfadion of the appellant's
judgment against her." Beehfre State Ba11k r. Rosq11ist,
supra at 22, 439 P.2d at 471. Because the written contract
governing the joint account in this case provided that
Ila R. Painter was the joint owm·r of the funds and was
entitled to withdraw the full total of the deposits from
said account (Exhibit 1-P; Record at 134 ), the trial
court held that Ila R. Painter's interest extended to the
entire amount in the joi11t account at the time of respondent's garnishment. (Record at 135.) Consequently, the
trial court awarded respondent judgment for the full
amount in the joint aeeom1t or $723.79, and dismissed
appellant's complaint in intel'\'ention with prejudice.
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The lower court's ruling is proper and is in harmony
with the terms of the contract by which appellant is conelusi vely bound. According to the agreement, appellant
and his wife each gave the other complete and absolute
authority over the funds in the account together with the
unconditional power to withdraw all or part thereof.
Likewise, the bank was obligated to pay all or part of
the funds in the account to either depositor or, more importantly, to the payee of either depositor as designated
by check. By the terms of the contract, appellant gave
his wife the right to pay any or all of her judgment debtors to the extent of the total fund in the account. Because appellant's wife could have paid her creditors
from the account, judicially enforced payment by way
of garnishment to the full extent of amount in the account should be permitted and indeed be mandatory. Any
other ruling would enhance the likelihood of defrauding
creditors and would ignore the literal terms of the contract. In addition, any judgment for less than the full
amount in the account would effectively create a nonstatutory exemption from garnishment for persons using
joint accounts. Those who enjoy the convenience of joint
accounts and who confer a total interest in the fund upon
both tenants jointly, should be held to the responsibilities
that arise from their legal relationship. Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Track, 233 Minn., 467, 47 N.W.2d 194
(1951); Empire Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Cioci, 4 D.L.R. 804
(1934).
Certainly one of the reasons that the law allows joint
tenancy interests to pass to the surviving joint tenant
without the formalities required of most testamentary
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dispositions is beeause both joint tenauts during their·
li,·es are deemed to be co-owners of the mHli,·ide<l property. Technically, when one of the joint tenants dies, the
surviYor is succeeding to nothi11g greater than he already
had a right to; he merely ow11s the property free of the
rights of equal enjoynwnt and occupm1cy of the deceased
tenant. It follo,rn, therefore, that unless the laws concerning testamentary disposition and probate are to be
ignored, the right of surviYorship must necessarily be
coupled with a present ull(li\·ided interest on the part •
of both joint tenants. Rights of i-mrvivorship and preseut
interest cannot be separated.
Appe1lant. contends that the joint bank account was
created to merely take advantage of the surYivorship ,
rights but not to bestow a present interest in and to the
funds on appellant's wife. Appellant warns this Court
not to "jeopardize or destroy the practice" utilized by
countless persons to pass deposits to surviving joint
tenants without the requirement of probate, and yet
urges the Court to hold that non-contributory joint tenants haYe 110 present interest to which a judgment creditor's execution can attach. Appellant is really urging
the Court to condone a method of avoiding the laws of
testamentary disposition not to mention a convenient
device for defrauding creditors. Certainly, when a husband and wife create a deliberate, contractual relationship with the admitted inh>nt of creating a right of surYivorship, they must accept all of the lr>gal relationships
that flow therefrom. If they intend to create a right
of sun·iYorship that cir<'Ulll\'ents probate, it is necessary
that a present interest in both tenants lw likewise created.
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POINT III
THE FACT OF APPELLANT'S EXCLUSIVE CONTRIBUTION 0 R PR I 0 R
OWNERSHIP OF THE FUNDS IN THE
JOINT ACCOUNT IS NOT OF CONTROLLING SIGNIFICANCE CONCERNING ILA
R. PAINTER'S IN'rEREST IN AND TO THE
JOINT BANK ACCOUNT.
In attempting to justify his claim to the joint bank
account, appellant asserts that the funds in the garnished
bank account had come from appellant's own sources,
that his wife did not make any deposits in the joint account, that the account was for the payment of household
expenses, that his wife could write checks on the account
but did not, and that his wife had a separate source of
funds for her own use. (Brief for Appellant at 9, 17.)
Respondent submits that even under Utah law prior to
Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, supra, and Continental
Bank and Trust Compooy v. Kimball, supra, these facts
are not of controlling significance in determining the
extent of Ila R. Painter's interest in and to the joint
account and are insufficient to defeat respondent's
proper garnishment of the funds in the account.

A. PRIOR UTAH CASES INVOLVING
JOIN'r BANK ACCOUNTS.
Despite seemingly conflicting results, the prior decision of this Court have consistently presumed, in the
ah8ence of rlear and convincing proof to the contrary,
that the written agreement set forth in the signature
rard goYeruing a joint bank account accurately recited
9

the intention of the partil's when they created the account and that evidence of the source or use of funds by
itself was not sufficient to infer a contrary intent.

In Hult c. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934),
this Court held for the sun·iviug joint tenant even though
there was eYidence that the entire sum in the joint aecount was deposited by the deceased. There was also
some evidence that the deceased intended that the other
joint tenant would acquire rights thereto only upon the
death of the deceased. The parties were held to be conclusively bound by the written contract in the absence
of proof of fraud, undue influe11ee, mistake or other infirmity. Subsequent cases (until Beehive State Bank r.
Rosq11ist, suzwa, and Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Kimball, supra, which reestablished the conclusive presumption) still retained the presumption in favor
of the written agreeme11t hut the ·written agreement was
held not to he concl usi ce evidence of the intention of the
parties.
In Neill v. Royce, 101Utah181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941),
a restraining order was placed on a joint bank account
by the first wife of one of the joint tenants. The other
tenant, the second wife, intervened claiming that the
money was hers because it had come from her own funds
and was not intended to he used by her husband. It was
held that the first wife's restraining order was proper
and should attach to the funds. In modifying Halt I'.
Bayles, supra, the Court statt><l that the written agreement erca tecl a non-co11clusi \'C' IJrPsumption of joint tenancy which could be overcome hut only by clear an<l con10

\'incing proof to the contrary. \Vith rN;pect to cvi<lence
offered concerning prior ownership and the source of
the joint account funds, the Court stated:
'l'h<> only cvide11ce refuting the implied joint
:-oavings account in the instant case was that of
the testimony of th(• eoclepositors to the effect
that their pm pose in c•sta hlishi11g the joint sa vings account was to take advantage of the sur\·ivorship provision, arnl that 1lie money was intended to be the sole and
property of the
intervener. Such proof under the circumstances
of this case cannot he termed so clear and convincing as to require the trial court to find in
favor of appellant. '11 0 say that it was sufficient
would thrffw open thP door to frau<l and collusion
as between coclepositors aucl thir<l parties. This
equity will not do.
101 Utah at 189, 120 P.2d at 331.
111 the case of First Security Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 10 Utah 2<l 405, 354 P.2cl 97 (1960), a husband had
created a joint account with hi8 wife (with whom he had
hecu having marital difficulties) just prior to his entering a hospital for treatmeut. While the husband was
in the hospital, the wife withdrew all the money and
plaet'd it in her own account. The Court was pursuaded
by dear and convincing evicleuce that the joint account
was created only for the 1mrposf' of facilitating money
management during the husband's stay in the hospital
and was not created to give tlw wife a survivorship right.
See Hanks 1'. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 347 n.5, 411 P.2d
836, 838 ii.5 ( 1966). The presumption of the written
agreement was overcome by more eviclf'llce that the mere

11

fact that the money originally belonged to the husband
or that the wife had made no deposits in the account.

In Tangren r. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179
(1961), summary judgment for the joint depositor was
reversed and the Court held that there should be a trial
on the merits to see "whether the appellant could meet
the requirement of presenting clear and convincing cYidence to attack the recitals on the deposit cards." 12
Utah 2d at 394, 267 P.2d at 184. Similarly, in Braegger
v. Loveland, 12 Utah 2d 384, 367 P.2d 177 (1961), after
a trial on the merits, the lower court divided the funds
in a joint bank account equally between the estate of one
joint tenant and the other surviving tenant. On appeal
this Court held that all of the money rightfully belonged
to the surviving joint tenant because the recitals of the
signature card had not been overcome by clear and co11vincing evidence of another intention of the parties nor
was there any charge of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or
undue influence.
In Haywood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d 299, 400 P.2d 16
( 1965), the lower court's finding for th<' surviving joi11t
tenant was affirmed. The Court stated:
Plaintiff's protestations that it is not sho1c11
that Violet ercr contributed to or deposited money
in this account is not of controlling s·ignificancc.
Upon the basis of documentary and other evidence, the trial court could regard the account as
just what it purported to be .... In view of the
documentary foundation of his fi11cli11gs, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, they should 11ot be disturbed.
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16 Utah 2d at 302, 400 P.2d at 18. (Emphasis added.) In
Culley v. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 404 P.2d 657 (1965), the
Court held that the estate of a deceased joint tenant was
entitled to the funds in the joi11t account and not the surviving joint tenant because surviYing tenant himself
testified that the deceased did not intend to give the
survivor a present interest but only intended to pass an
iuterest upon the death of the deceased. In the opinion
of the Court this was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the written agreement. See Hanks
v. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 347 n.5, 411 P.2d 836, 838 n.5
(1966). In Hanks v. Hales, supra, it was held that the
trial court is to determine "whether or not the provisions
in the written instrument should be endowed with presumptive validity and should be given effect or whether
the written contract can be successfully attacked and
overcome by clear and convincing evidence.'' Once the
trial court has made the determination, the Supreme
Court may rule to the contrary only if all reasonable
miuds would so believe from the evidence.
B. SUMMARY OF THE UTAH LAW.
The following principles are apparent from the
foregoing cases prior to the restatement of the law in
the recent cases of Beehi1:e State Bank v. Rosquist,
supra, and Continental Bank and Trust Company v.
Kimball, supra.
1. The written contract governing a joint bank aceouut '.vas presumed to be valid and was presumed to

rceite the intention of the parties.
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2. The written agreement could he unenforceable
because of fraud, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity.

3. An interested party could show another agreement existing between the parties and defeat the presumptive validity of the written agreement but only if
such showing is made liy dear and convincing evidence.

4. Evidence of the source of the funds or the lack
of contribution of one of the joiut tenants was not itself
sufficient to show another agreement of the parties.

5. The trial court's determination of whether an
agreement different from the written agreement governing the joint account has been proven by clear and convincing evidence would be gin•n defereuce and would
be set aside on appeal only if all reasouable minds would
reach a result contrary to the trial eourt upon the basis
of the evidence.
C. THE EVIDENCE IN
INSTANT
CASE PRECLUDES RECOVERY BY APPELLANT.

Appellant has now had his trial 011 the merits of his
claim for intervention. The signature card governing
the joint account ·was introduced. Aecording to that
agreement, appellant and his wife ngTeell with each othc1
that th0y owned the fm1ds joi11tly and that either could
write a check for th0 total amount in th0 arcouut. A pre·
sumption arose at that poi11t that this agreement wa'
valid and accurately emhodi0cl the intention of the partic'
thereto. Under prior Utah cases, appellant had the bur-
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den of showing some other intention of the parties by
dear and convincing evidence or of proving that the
contract was unenforceable.
The only documentary evidence offered by appellant
concerned the source of the funds in the account. His
own oral testimony only showed that the account "\Vas for
household expenses, that his wife could write checks on
the account but did not, and that his wife had a cash allowance separate from the joint account. There was no
dired evidence of the intention of the parties other than
the written agreement. None of the evidence adduced
\ms necessarily inconsistent with the recitals in the
\\Titten account agreement. Evidence by a joint tenant
concerning the source of the funds or the depositor's intention merely to create a survivorship interest is not
of controlling significance nor does it defeat the presumption of the written agreement. Haywood v. Gill, 16
Utah 2d 299, 302, 400 P.2d 16, 18 (1965); Neill v. Royce,
101 Utah 181, 189, 120 P.2d 327, 331 (1941). Even if
appellant had testified concerning his and his wife's
intentions when the account was created, such evidence
would be hardly clear and convincing in light of the
obvious financial interest of the witness and the lack
of any other probative evidence on the issue of intent.
Srp Neill u. Royce, supra at 189, 120 P.2cl at 331. There
was 110 evidence whatsoever of fraud, mistake, incapacity,
r>r other infirmity.
'rhe trial court ruled that the joint account contract
was the only agreement between appellant and his wife
a11c1 was valid and e1iforccable. The court also ruled

15

that there was no evidence presented to show that ap.
pellant was the sole owner of th0 funds iu the joint ar.
count or that the terms of joint aceount contract should
be modified or varied. The lower court found that the
appellant had not overcome thr presumption of the writ.
ten agrerment. From the state of the evidence, the lower
court's decision should be affirmed.
POINT IV
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAil\1 AN INTEREST TO THFJ JOINT BANK ACCOUNT
BY ANY ALLEGED RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.
Appellant lays claim to judgment in this case because he is both the surviving joint tenant of the join!
bank account and the sole contributor of the funds there·
in. Appellant attempts to harmonize the prior decisions
of this Court with respect to joint bank accounts by
claiming benefit of both lines of cases - those holding
for the surviving joint tenant and those holding for the
contributor of the funds (or his estate). Respondent
respectfully submits that appellant cannot properly rely
on both theories of recovery in this action and is effec·
tively foreclosed from asserting a claim based on any
alleged right of survivorship.
The critical date in this case is February 3, 1964,
the date the writ of garnishme11t was served on the
garnishee bank and the dah> the funds iu the joint bank
account were encumbered liy respondent's post-juclgment
remedies. Ila R. Painter did not die a11d appellant's sur·
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\·ivorship right in the joint account did not arise until
more than two years after the writ of garnishment was
served. Consequently, appellant can claim the funds in
the account by a right of si1rvivorship only if the writ of
garnishment was legally defective or had been released
or set aside before his wife's death. If appellant's wife
had no interest in the account to which the writ could
attach, there could likewise be nothing for appellant to
succeed to under a survivorship right. Thus, if appellant
seriously asserts ownership to the funds by a right of
survivorship, he must take the position that his wife
indeed had an interest in the account but that the garnishment somehow did not encumber that interest.
Respondent readily agrees with appellant that Ila
R. Painter had an interest in the joint account. However,
the writ of garnishment was and is valid and subsisting.
Appellant has never challenged and does not now challenge the legal sufficiency of the writ of garnishment
itself. (The lower court expressly held that the garnishment was proper and valid and still in force and effect
at the time of trial. Record at 135.) The garnishment has
llC\'er been released by respondent nor has it been discharged or set aside by court action. Consequently, the
lien or encumbrance placed on the joint account would
necessarily be prior to a survivorship claim by appellant,
and any survivorship interest of appellant would be subject thereto. Thus, appellant is foreclosed from claiming
the funds in the account by an alleged survivorship right.

17

POINT V
APPELLANT IS NO'l1 K'JTI'fLED TO
DAMAGES OR ATTORNEY'S FICES EEC AUS E OF
ALLEGED
"WRONGFUL ATTACHl\IEN'r.
Respondent's actio11s in ohtaining the writ of gar.
nishment and in failing to release the funds in the account to appellant were in no way wrongful. First, the
writ of garnishment "·as issued pursuant to a lawful
judgment that respondent had obtained against Ila R.
Painter, the judgment debtor. Seco11d, the purpose of the
subsequent judicial proceedi11gs was to determine the
right of the judgment debtor to the funds in the encumbered account. As stated in 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executiom
§776 (1967):
''The object of supplementary proceedings
is not to obtain a new judgment for a debt, but
to enable the judgm0nt creditor to enforce the
judgment he has already obtained. They are designed to proYide a useful, efficacious, and salu·
tary remedy at law, and to afford to a judgment
creditor the most complete relief possible in satis·
fying his judgment. A pitrJJOse of the proceedings
is to ascertain whether the judqmcnt debtor oirns
property u:hich ca11 be applied i11 satisfaction of
the judgment. Such proceedings are particularly
designed to reach and apply to the satisfaction of
the judgment, property of the judgment debtor
which is concealed, or which is in the hands of a
third person and which cannot be reached by the
ordinary execution.''
(Emphasis added.)
Respondent should not be
heeause it has at·
tempted through proeeedings pursuant to the writ of
O"arnishmeut to ascertain the judgment lkhtor's interest
b
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and has not released funds to appellant. Third, the explicit terms of the written agreement governing the joint
account provide that the judgment debtor was the joint
omier of the funds and, under Utah law, there has always
been a presumption that the facts recited in the written
agreement accurately set forth the intention and rights
of the parties thereto. The mere claim by appellant that
he contributed or owned the funds would not, under Utah
law, be clear and convincing evidence of another agreement of the parties. Consequently, respondent was justified in seeking a garnishee judgment for the funds in
the account in spite of appellant's claims.
When this Court and a trial court have previously
held in favor of respondent's right to execute upon Ila
R. Painter's interest to the account, respondent's acts
ran hardly be classified as "wrongful, improper or tortiously employed'' within the meaning of the authorities
cited by appellant. Appellant's claim for damages and
attorney's fees is without basis in law or in fact.
CONCLUSION
'l'he lower court's ruling is in accordance with sound
legal principles and with precedent established by this
Court. Judgment for respondent should be affirmed in
all respects.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Robert M. Anderson
Roger H. Thompson
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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